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What Does Godel's Second Theorem Say?t
MICHAEL DETLEFSEN*
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to improve our understanding of the philo-
sophical application of Godel's Second Theorem (hereinafter, G2). Most
specifically, it is to call attention to certain problems, heretofore largely
unnoticed, facing the application of generalized versions of G2. As Bernays
noted (cf. Hilbert-Bernays [1939], §§5.1c-5.2e), Godel's original proof of G2
wanted generalization of two types. One of these is 'system generalization',
the purpose of which is to secure the application of G2 to a broader class
of theories than is provided for by Godel's original proof. It consists in the
specification of a general set of expressive, logical and arithmetical proper-
ties the possession of which by a theory would guarantee the applicability
of G2 to it, at least with respect to consistency formulae constructed after
the manner of the consistency formula of Godel's original proof.
The other type of generalization—call it 'expression generalization'—is
intended to extend the G2 phenomenon from the particular type of con-
sistency formulae that Godel used to all formulae capable of expressing
consistency. The goal is to obtain a result that can be taken to show, of
any theory to which it applies, that ' Uie formalized expression of its [the
theory's] consistency can not be derived within it so long as it is consistent'
(cf. Hilbert and Bernays [1939], p. 324, brackets, emphasis and translation
mine).
Bernays pursued expression generalization by identifying a set of gen-
eral conditions (commonly referred to as the 'Hilbert-Bernays Derivability
Conditions') on 'genuine' consistency formulae for any of the theories to
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38 DETLEFSEN
which G2 was to be applied.1 The idea was that (i) any formula capable of
expressing the consistency of the theory would have to satisfy these condi-
tions, and that (ii) any formula satisfying them would be guaranteed to be
unprovable in the theory so long as it was consistent.
Satisfaction of (ii) is a matter that can be (and has been) settled by proof.
Satisfaction of (i), on the other hand, is not. It requires what we will refer
to as justification of the Derivability Conditions (DCs). By justification of
the DCs, we mean an acceptable argument showing that any formula Ccnvr
capable of expressing the consistency of the system T must satisfy the DCs.
To justify the DCs is therefore to establish them as necessary conditions on
the ability of a formula to serve as an expression of consistency. Clearly,
this is something different from proving the DCs.
Our chief concern in this paper is the justification of the DCs. More
particularly, it is the justification of the so-called 'Third Derivability Con-
dition' (the 'Third Condition', for short). More particularly still, it is one
particular justification of the Third Condition—a justification we will refer
to as the Reflexivity Defense.
• We will argue that adopting the Reflexivity Defense has serious conse-
quences. More accurately, we will argue that, for suitable system general-
izations of G2, use of the Reflexivity Defense induces a Fourth Derivability
Condition whose justification is fraught with difficulties. Our conclusion
is therefore that the Reflexivity Defense does not provide a satisfactory
justification of the Third Condition.
This naturally raises the question of whether there are other plausible
justifications of the Third Condition that avoid introduction of the prob-
lematic 'Fourth' condition just mentioned. We lack the space to argue this
matter properly here. We believe, however, that the answer is 'no', that the
Reflexivity Defense is the most satisfying justification of the Third Condi-,
tion that there is and that there is a high price to be paid for relinquishing
it.
2. Clarifications and Qualifications
In order to develop our argument, certain preliminary clarifications need
to be made and certain basic distinctions drawn. It is to these that we
now turn, beginning with what we will refer to as the 'proto-philosophicaT
content of G2, or what G2 can be taken to 'say' for general purposes of
philosophical application.
This notion Ls one-half of a distinction between literal and interpreted
versions of G2. By literal versions we mean those which proceed by way of a
mathematically precise description of various components of a given arith-
1
 Somewhat more accurately, ihey are conditions placed on the formulae expressing
tliu notion of provabilily—or derivaljility-in-7'—from which the consistency formulae are
to be defined.
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GODEL 39
metization. These components include (i) the theory (referred to here as
the repivsented theory and designated throughout this paper by the letter
'T") whose syntax or nietamathematics is to be represented by the arith-
metization, (ii) the theory (referred to here as the representing theory, and
typically designated by the letter '5 ') in which the representation is to take
place, and (iii) various formulae used by the representing theory to repre-
sent metamathematical notions or concepts (e.g., the notion of consistency)
pertaining to the represented theory. The descriptions of and conditions on
these items play a central role in the proof of G2 and they form the main
components of what we are referring to as literal versions of G2.
The following illustrates what we mean by a literal version of G2.
Literal G2: Let Provr(x) be a formula of CT (= the language of T) that
satisfies the Derivability Conditions (i.e., DC1-DC3 below) and the
Diagonalization Lemma (i.e., DL below). And let COTIT be the for-
mula Vx(Provr(x) —» -'Provr(neg(x))) of CT (where 'neg(x)' is a
term of £-/• that represents the negation function). Then, if T is
consistent and its logic supports certain inferences and theorems (to
be identified later), (A/- COTLT-
DL: There is a sentence Q of CT such that hy Q «-• ->Provr(rG~1)-
DC1: For every sentence A of CT, if \~T A, then \~T ProvT{rA'y).
DC2: For all sentences A, B of Cr,
r-T Praur{rA -> B">) - ( P i w j f i " 1 ) - Provr(rB^)).
DC3: For every sentence A of CT,
\-T Prawii rA"') -> Prour(rProu-p (rj[ n) n).
Though illustrative of what we mean by a literal version of G2, Literal
G2 is nonetheless not entirely typical of what we have in mind. The reason
is that it fails adequately to mark a distinction that is vital to our argument:
namely the distinction between the represented and representing theories
of a given arithmetization.
Rather than allow the representing and represented theories to be dif-
ferent theories, which is the general case, Literal G2 assumes that a single
theory (denoted by 'T' in the above statement) should play the role of both.
This does not threaten the accuracy or denionstrability of Literal G2 since
there clearly are monotlieoretic versions of G2 (i.e., versions in which the
representing and represented theories are the same theory).
For certain purposes, however, it is necessary to allow the representing
and represented theories to be distinct. Indeed, we consider this to be nec-
essary for what, is perhaps the most important philosophical application
of G2—namely, that to Hilbert's Program. We are therefore interested in
bithecrretic versions of G2; versions in which it is allowed that the repre-
senting and represented theories be different. We'll give a more careful
statement of the precise type of bithcoretic version of Literal G2 we're in-
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40 DETLEFSEN
terested in a little later. For the moment we wish only to note that the
literal version of G2 that we will ultimately be interested in is different from
Literal G2.
This said, let us now say what we mean by 'interpreted' or 'proto-
philosophical' versions of G2. These differ from literal versions in that
they replace the formal conditions on the key representing formulae of
the representing theory (e.g., the conditions DC1-DC3 placed on the for-
mulae Prowrix) and Conr) by conditions that 'interpret' these in terms
of their importance to the proper representation of the metamathemati-
cal notions that the formulae involved are to represent (here, the notions
of provability-in-T and consistency of T). Thus, a proto-philosophical or
interpreted version of G2—and the one we're particularly interested in—
is obtained by (i) taking DC1-DC3 as necessary conditions on the ad-
equacy of Provr{x) as an expression of the notion of provability-in-T
and by (ii) taking the constraint that COTIT be defined as the formula
Vx{Provr{x) —* -'Provr{neg(x))) (or some similar formula) as a necessary
condition on the adequacy of Conr as a representation of T's consistency,
given that Provr{x) adequately expresses the notion of provability-in-T.
Combining these 'interpretations' of the conditions appealed to in Literal
G2, we arrive at the following proto-philosophical version of G2.
Phil G2: Let Pravr(x) be a formula of CT that expresses the notion of
provability-in-T, and let COTLT be a formula of CT that is con-
structed from Provr{x) in such away that if Provr{x) expresses
the notion of provability-in-T, then Conr expresses the notion of
T's consistency. Then, if T Ls consistent and its logic supports
certain inferences and theorems, f-vCom.-r-
The reader will recognize Phil G2 as a somewhat more careful version
of the usual type of informal statement of G2 found in the logical and
philosophical literature, including the statement by Bernays quoted above.
Again, we call it a 'proto-philosophical' statement of G2 because, though it
does not itself constitute a philosophical application of G2, it is the type of
statement uj>on which such an application must be based. So, to illustrate,
while Phil G2 docs not itself state that G2 refutes Hilbert's Program, it is
nonetheless the type of statement to which such an evaluation of Hilbert's
Program must needs appeal. It is, in a word, what for philosophical pur-
poses we might regard G2 as 'saying'.
Described thus, the notion of G2's proto-philosophical content is clearly
related to the notion of a 'justification' for the Derivability Conditions men-
tioned earlier. The Derivability Conditions are, most directly, conditions
on the choice of formulae to represent the notion of provability-in-T. A jus-
tification of a Derivability Condition will therefore consist in an argument
establishing a necessary link between the given condition and the proper
representation of the notion of provability for the represented theory. Taken
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GODEL 41
together, such arguments will constitute a larger argument establishing the
following.
Pivotal Implication (PI): If Provr(x) expresses the notion of provability-
in-T in T, then Prour(x) satisfies DC1-DC3.
This larger argument will involve analyzing the notions of provability-in-
T and/or proper representation of provability-in-T in T to the point of
revealing that they require satisfaction of DC1-DC3.
As mentioned above, our concern in this essay is with the justification
of the Third Condition. It follows that we are concerned with the proper
representation of the key nictamathematical notions of proof and/or prov-
ability and consistency. But what is the conception of representation that
figures here?
We can begin by noting that it is not merely a semantical conception.
That is, it is not merely a conception according to which a formula achieves
its representational end when its semantical interpretation produces an ex-
tension, and perhaps also an intension, that 'matches' (modulo the relevant
encoding/decoding) those of the notion it is supposed to represent. It is
rather what I would call an 'epistemic' conception of representation—that
is, a conception according to which proper representation requires the rep-
resenting entity to 'know' or 'grasp' or 'register' various facts concerning
the notions it represents. On such a conception, and assuming that the
representing device is a theory (hence a device which 'knows' or 'grasps'
or 'registers' a given fact by pmving it), the adequacy of a formula T as
a representation of a set or a notion $ is determined by what theorems
involving T the representing theory proves. The success or failure of T as
a representation of $ thus consists in something other than a purely se-
mantical relationship between ^"and $. It consists as well in a relationship
between the 'facts' concerning <& and the theorems involving T that the
representing theory can prove.
The notion of representation with which we are concerned is therefore
not one that is focused exclusively on the semantical interpretation (under
an assumed interpretation of the language of the representing theory) of
representing formulae. It is also one which distinguishes between the rep-
resentation, of sets, on the one hand, and the representation of concepts or
notions, on the other.
According to this distinction, a set $ is represented by a formula T(x)
in a theory T only if, for each e that qualifies as a possible candidate for
membership in $, T proves T(e) (where 'e' is a recognized name for e in
the language of T)2 just in case e is an clement of $.
2
 To give an exact (and compelling) account of what it should mean to say that a given
term is a 'recognized' name for something in a given language is no easy matter. Since,
however, the difficulties involved in doing so do not afTect the project of this paper in
any special way, we will not give such an account here.
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42 DETLEFSEN
Adequate 'intensional' (or 'intensionally adequate') representation of a
pivperty, concept, or notion $ by a fonnula F(x) in a theory T seems
to require something more than mere adequate representation of the set
that is <&'s extension. It might, for example, require as well that T prove
certain features of the 'logic' of $ with respect to T(x). Or it might make
use of a type of meta-condition requiring that certain facts concerning $'s
representation by J-(x) themselves be registered as theorems of T.3 This
latter type of constraint figures centrally in the so-called Reflexivity Defense
of the Third Condition.
Generally speaking, intensional representation conceives of a theory not
merely as a set of theorems but as a set of theorems given by a certain
concept or property. It therefore requires fidelity not only to the extension
of the theory but also to the concept of provability by which it is given. For
the most part, it is this intensional conception of theory with which we are
concerned in this paper.4
The above remarks also suggest another distinction that is important
for our discussion. This is the distinction between what we will refer to
as the rejrresenhng theory and the repivsented theory of a representational
scheme. For a given mctamathematical property or set <&, the theory to
whose metainathematics $ pertains (the represented theory) need not be
the same as the theory in which its representation is given (the representing
theory). We want to consider what happens to the DCs and their justifica-
tion when one makes systematic allowance for such a distinction between
representing and represented theories.
There are two reasons why this is important to our discussion. The first
is that it points up an element of unclarity in the usual 'monotheoretic'
formulations of G2 (e.g., that referred to above as 'Literal G2').5 In such
formulations, some of the references to T are references to it in its capac-
ity as representing tlieory while others are references to it in its capacity as
represented tliecrry. The justification of the Derivability Conditions requires
a clear demarcation of these roles. A justifiable constraint on the represent-
ing theory of a representational scheme can not generally be expected to be
a justifiable constraint on the represented theory of that scheme, and vice
versa. The justification of representational constraints therefore generally
requires a distinction between the representing and represented theories of
a repr&scntational scheme. In addition, we will argue, observance of the
3
 This type of constraint would hold if the notion of representation were 'internalist'
in a certain sense—that is, if, in order to represent a given notion N, a representing
fonnula V. would not only have to register correctly the extension and certain features
of the internal logic of N, but also have to 'see' itself as doing so.
4
 The intensional vs. extensional terminology was Introduced in Feferman (I960]. See
Feferman [ 1082) and |1989| for developments of the analysis begun there.
6
 By a 'monotheorelic' statement of G2, we mean a statement of it in which the rep-
resenting and represented theories are the same theory.
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GODEL 43
representing/represented distinction can itself lead to the introduction of
substantive additions to the usual conditions on intensional representation
that figure in the proof of G2.
The second reason the representing vs. represented theory distinction is
important for our purposes is that, as indicated above, certain applications
of G2 require that we allow the two to be different. The particular applica-
tion we have in mind is the application of G2 to the evaluation of Hilbert's
Program. It requires that we allow the representing theory to become as
weak as (some codification of) finitary reasoning while, at the same time,
allowing the represented theory to be as strong as the strongest classical
theory that possesses the type of instrumental virtues for which Hilbert
generally prized classical mathematics (e.g., various systems of set theory).
If the G2 phenomenon were to hold only for some environments contaming
finitary reasoning, and not for all of them, it would not be legitimate to take
it as refuting Hilbert's Program because it would not then be an invariant
feature of all (proper) representational environments. Justifications of the
DCs must therefore be valid not only in the monotheoretic setting but also
in the appropriate bitheoretic settings.
We close this section with a final clarification. It concerns a certain rel-
ativization that seems to be built into the notion of representation, and
which we must therefore expect to be reflected in any 'justification' of the
DCs as representational constraints. This relativization consists in the fact
that what can and should count towards accuracy of representation will
generally be determined by the purpose or set of purposes for which a
given representation is wanted. Talk of the justification of the DCs there-
fore presupposes a (set of) representational purpose(s) that is (are) to be
achieved through their institution. It is not to be expected that all such
purposes will call for the same constraints or even that they will include
some decisive common core of them. To give definition to our investigation
of the justification of the DCs, therefore, we must identify a set of purposes
with respect to which representational adequacy is to be judged. For the
sake of concreteness, we will take this purpose to be that of evaluating
Hilbert's Program. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the
argument given here is adaptable to a variety of other purposes as well.
3. The Reflexivity Defense of the Third Condition.
P.-G. Odifrcddi states the idea behind the Reflexivity Defense of the Third
Condition as follows.
The first condition [DC1] was external to T, saying that any single provable
formula can be recognized to be provable by T. This . . . condition [i.e., DC3]
is internal to T, and says that T is aware of the first condition: inside T we
know that if a formula is provable then we can prove this fact. (Odifreddi
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44 DETLEFSEN
[1989], p. 169, brackets and emphasis mine)6
In order to obtain a suitably clear and general statement of this defense,
we must determine which references to T are essentially references to it in its
role as i-epresented theory (of the given arithmetization or representational
scheme) and which are references to it in its role as representing theory. To
this end, we offer the following restatement of Odifreddi's claim.
(RD-I): The first condition [DC1] is external to T, saying that any single
formula provable in T can be recognized by T to be provable in T.
This ... condition [i.e., DC3] is internal to T, and says that T is
aware of the first condition: inside T we know that if a formula is
provable in T then we can prove this fact in T.7
Of the nine references to T in the above, the first, third, fifth, sixth,
seventh, and ninth seem clearly to be references to T in its capacity as
representing theory. Equally clearly, the second, fourth, and eighth are
references to T in its capacity as represented theory.
Designating the representing theory of an arithmetization by 'S' and the
corresponding represented theory by 'T', we can thus rewrite the above
statement as follows.
(RD-II): The first condition is external to S, saying that any single formula
provable in T can be recognized by S to be provable in T. The
third condition is internal to S, and says that 5 is aware of the first
condition: inside 5 we know that if a formula is provable in T then
we can prove this fact in S.
A. (the only?) plausible reading of Odifreddi yields this as the generalized
(i.e., bitheoretic) thesis of the Reflexivity Defense. We are left to our own
devices to discover the deeper reasoning that is supposed to support such
a view.
There seem to be two different directions in which to seek such support.
On one of these—what we will refer to as the 'logical' variant—the Third
Condition expresses a feature of the internal logic of the notion of repre-
sentation. It maintains, that Ls, that in order for a formula T{x) of the
6
 Others also suggest, this defense. See, for example, Smorynski [1977], p. 829, and
PrawiU [1981|, p. 2G1. It is not clear from the statements in Smornyski and Prawitz,
however, whether they think of DC3 as a precept of the 'logic' of the concept of repre-
sentation or as stemming from some other source. Odifreddi's statement is, of course,
somewhat inaccurate. What T is 'aware of when DC3 is satisfied is not DC1, but each
of Ihe several instances of DC1.
7
 This (and later reformulations) preserves the possible 'overstatement' of Odifreddi's
original monotheorelic formulation. DC3 does not say that T knows that every formula
provable in 7' is such that its provability-in-7' is provable in 7'. Rather, it makes only
the more 'local' claim that 7' knows of any formula o(T that if it is provable in T, then
T can prove this fact.
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GODEL 45
language of a theory S to i^epresent a set or notion $ of the metamathe-
matics of T in 5, it must not only be the case that, for all e, e € $ only if
\~s T{e) but also that 5 'sees' this as holding. In other words, S's ability
to represent $ by T{x) requires not only a coordination of facts concerning
$ with 'beliefs' (i.e., theorems) of 5 concerning ^(x); it requires as well an
'awareness' or 'grasp' or 'registration' of this coordination by S. Without
this latter, the thinking continues, S could not rightly be thought of as
having the capacity to use what it 'believes' (i.e., can prove) about J\x)
to serve as a guide to facts concerning <£. And without this type of self-
reflective capacity on S's part, the defense concludes, S could not rightly
be said to represent $ by F{x).
On this account, then, representation is an inherently reflexive affair: hi
order for agent a to represent <5 by J^x), it is required not only that the
instances of ^(x) that a believes be 'true' of $ . It is required as well that
a herself grasp or believe in (the instances of) this correlation, by means of
some concept she has of herself as a believing agent.
The other variant of the Reflexivity Defense—what we will call the 'ev-
identiary' variant—is based on the very different idea that in order for the
First Condition to play its proper role in S's representation of provability-
in-T by Provr(x), the several instances of that condition must be verifiable
by a certain type of evidence—evidence which, as it happens, is codifiable
in S.8 On this variant of the Reflexivity Defense, the Third Condition is
not a consequence of the fact that 5 is the representing theory of the given
representational scheme. Rather, it is a consequence of choosing the repre-
senting theory (S) to be a fonnalization of the type of evidence regarded as
the proper standard for verification of the instances of the First Condition.
This is a very different thing.
Of these two variants of the Reflexivity Defense, the logical variant seems
the more basic. We do not insist upon this, however, since our purposes do
not require it. We distinguish these two strains of the Reflexivity Defense
only to give the reader an idea of its overall breadth and versatility, to
inform her of the general fact that it signifies not a single justificatory idea
but a (small?) family of such and, finally, to distinguish the Reflexivity
Defense, as one broad strategic alternative regarding the justification of
the Third Condition, from a very different type of defense that we will now
briefly describe.
This alternative is what we call the StrengUi Defense. It sees the Third
Condition as a special case of a deeper constraint—namely, the S-provable
8
 Hero we are generally thinking of a bitheoretic formulation of the First Condition and
not the nionotheoretic formulation given in DC1. That is, we are generally thinking of
the following condition:
Bi-DCI: Tor every sentence A of Or, if \~T -A, then (-5
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46 DETLEFSEN
Ei-completeness of T.° Moreover, it sees the justificatory idea behind this
condition as entirely different from that underlying (either variant of) the
Reflexivity Defense. Roughly, it is that 5 can not adequately represent T
unless it 'sees' certain crucial facts concerning what T proves. Specifically,
it can not hope to represent T adequately unless it not only sees of each
true Ei formula of the language of 5 that T proves it, but also sees of each
Ei formula a of the language of S that if a, then T proves a.
To be interestingly different from the Reflexivity Defense, the Strength
Defense has to be taken as based upon a different conception of the relation-
ship between the First and Third Conditions than that which is assumed
by the Reflexivity Defense. In other words, it can't be taken as the mere
requirement that S 'see' the several instances of a reconceived version of
the First Condition which states that S proves (a formula expressing) ev-
ery true Ei statement of informal arithmetic. The thought must rather be
that certain elements of T's interior are so important to its identity that
any good representation of it must see those elements as belonging to it.
The challenge in defending such an idea, of course, is to say what it could
be about some elements of T's interior that makes knowledge of their be-
longing to it more important to the representation of T than is the same
knowledge with respect to other elements of its interior (or, for that matter,
the parallel knowledge with respect to elements of T's exterior).
We do not believe that this challenge can be adequately met. Conse-
quently, we do not believe that the Strength Defense provides a successful
justification for the Third Condition. To argue for this belief, however, is
not our concern here. We mention the Strength Defense for two reasons
only. The first is to make clear to the reader that we are aware that there
are alternatives to the Reflexivity Defense and that the present essay can
not, by itself, be regarded as a conclusive general treatment of the justifi-
cation of the Third Condition. The second is to point out the existence of
bitheoret.ic treatments of G2 that do not require introduction of a formula
PTOVS(X) representing the notion of provability for the representing theory
of a representational scheme.10 This constitutes a major difference between
the Reflexivity and Strength Defenses and to put the present discussion in
proper perspective, it is important to bear this difference in mind.
9
 That is, the condition:
Bi-DC3#: For every Ei sentence a of Cs, ^s a -> Provr(ra~^).
This is accurate, of course, only for theories of the type we take S to be—namely,
theories containing an existential quantifier and capable of expressing a genuine notion
of provability. For theories with no existential quantifier (eg., the usual formulations of
PRA), hence no genuine notion of provability, a different condition is needed.
10
 On the Strength Defense, a sufficient set of conditions for (a bitheoretic form of)
G2 would be Bi-DCl, Bi-DC2 and Bi-DC3#. Notice that, In contrast to the conditions
coining from the Reflexivity Defense, no formula Provs(x) representing the notion of
provability-in-S appears anywhere in these conditions.
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GODEL 47
The difference becomes apparent when we consider the second clause of
the Reflexivity Defense; the clause which says (as in RD-II) '[t]he third
condition is internal to S, and says that S is aware of the first condition:
inside S we know that if a formula is provable in T then we can prove
this fact in S\ This is the clause in the Reflexivity Defense that requires
introduction of a formula lProvs(x)' expressing (S's conception of) the
notion of provability-in-S. It mandates a reflection by S on its own ability
to detect and register the fundamental facts concerning the extension of
the notion of provability-in-T.
The Reflexivity Defense thus suggests the following bitheoretic general-
izations of DCl and DC3.
Bi-DCl: For every sentence A of Cr, if \~TA, then \-s Provr{rA~1).
Bi-DC3: For every sentence A of Cr,
\-s PrauT(rA^) — Provs{rProvT(rA~f)^).
The antecedent of Bi-DC3 (i.e., the formula 'ProvrCA^Y) should express
the antecedent of Bi-DCl (i.e., the metatheoretic statement '\~T A') and its
consequent should express the consequent of Bi-DCl. Since this latter is the
metatheoretic statement 'r-$ Provr^A^)', it follows that the consequent
of the Third Condition should be a formula 'Provs^Provr^A^Y,
where 'Provs(x)' expresses 'hs'-
Generally speaking, we will use the letters ' 5 ' and 'T' to stand for sets
of sentences—sets of sentences which form the extensions of theories. For
convenience sake, however, we will generally speak of S and T as 'theories'
rather than 'extensions of theories'. Also, in order to capture the type of
relationship between 5 and T that we are generally interested in, we will
assume that the language of S is a sublanguage of the language of T and
that. 5 is a subtheory of T ('S C T", in our notation).11 We will argue
that the conditions required for production of the G2 phenomenon in this
type of bitheoretic setting differ significantly from those required for its
production in the monotheoretic setting.
To this end, we will now consider what happens to G2 and its proof
when, as per the dictates of the Reflexivity Defense, the forms of the First
and Third Conditions used are those given in Bi-DCl and Bi-DC3.
4. Effects of the Reflexivity Defense on the Proof of G2
To secure a proof of a bitheoretic version of G2 (Bi-G2) under the Reflexiv-
ity Defense of the Third Condition, we need not only Bi-DCl and Bi-DC3,
but. also the following bitheoretic modifications of the DL and DC2.
Bi-DL: There is a sentence Q of Cs such that \-s Q
Bi-DC2: For all sentences A, B of CT,
11
 We do not, however, assume that all proofs of 5 are proofe of T.
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4 8 DETLEFSEN
Iii addition, we need a Fourth Condition that assures 5 'access' to the
relationship (viz., S C T) which, in the hypothesis of our bitheoretic version
of G2, we assume to exist between S and T. Specifically, we need
Bi-DC4: For all sentences A of Cs, \~s Provs(rA^)^> Provr(rA~t).
With Bi-DL and Bi-DCl-Bi-DC4 at our disposal, we can prove the core
lemma needed for the proof of (a bitheoretic version of) G2—namely
Bi-G2 Lemma: Let SCT and let Provr(x) and Provs(x) be formulae of
Cs that satisfy Bi-DCl-Bi-DC4 and Bi-DL. In addition, let ConT
be the formula ~ix(Prao-r(x) —* ->Provr(neg(x))) of Cs- Then, if
the logic of S supports certain inferences and theorems (made clear
in the proof below), \-$ Con-p —+ Q.
P7vof (description of how to build a proof in S of iConT —> <?'):
(1) \~s ~G —• ~*G Logic of S
(2) h s
(3) l-s
—> Provs(rFr<ju-i<
(4) I—s "'G —* PTOVS (' PTOUr(yg ')"')
(1), Bi-DL, logic of 5
Bi-DC3
(5) h s
(6) ^s
(7) r-5
(8) hS
(9) hs
(10) hs Prcwr(
(11)
r-
(13) I-.s
(14) h s
(2), (3), logic of S
(4), Bi-DC4
Bi-DL
(6), SCT , Bi-DCl
(7), Provr-<->
contraposition
(8), Provr-+->
simplification
(9), B1-DC2
(10), Provr-
(5), (11), logic of 5
(6), (12), logic of 5
Dcf. of COTIT, logic of S
(13), (14), logic of 5
(15), logic of 5
(15) h 5 ->£ -> -.Con r
(16) l-s C m r - C?
Bi-G2 Lemma together with
Bi-Gl.l: Let. 5 be a consistent theory such that SCT, and let Provr{x)
and g be formulae of Cs which satisfy Bi-DL and Bi-DCl. Then \f-s
then yields the following generalized 'literal' version of G2
Bi-G2: L c t S C T and let ProvT(x) and Praus{x) be formulae of Cs
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that together satisfy Bi-DCl-Bi-DC4 and the Bi-DL. In addition,
let COIIT be the formula VX(PTOVT(X) —* ->Provr(neg(x))) of Cs-
Then, if S is consistent and the logic of 5 supports certain inferences
and theorems, tys Cony-
These are the basic results with which we will be concerned. Before
passing to our main argument, however; we'd like to call attention to a
certain feature of the proof of Bi-G2 Lemma—specifically, the segment
composed of lines (3)-(5). What we would like to note is that it is in lines
(3)-(5) that Bi-DC3 and Bi-DC4 do their work. In effect, they take us from
an application of Bi-DC3 to what is essentially an 5-theoretic version of
DC3, namely
Bi-DC3A: For every sentence A of CT,
It is Bi-DC3A that is critical to the proof of Bi-G2 Lemma. Bi-DC3 (i.e.,
the version of the Third Condition yielded by the Refiexivity Defense) thus
gains its effect in the proof of Bi-G2 Lemma by bemg supplemented by a
condition (viz., Bi-DC4) that allows it to be extended to Bi-DC3A.
We point this out to guard against a possible misunderstanding of our
employment of Bi-DC3. We use Bi-DC3 rather than Bi-DC3A as our vari-
ant of the Third Condition because our interest is in the Reflexivity De-
fense. Given Bi-DCl as the form in which we have the First Condition, it is
Bi-DC3 rather than Bi-DC3A that is justified by the Reflexivity Defense.
Hence, if our proof of Bi-G2 is to fit the Reflexivity Defense, it must derive
Bi-DC3A from Bi-DC3; that is, it must see Bi-DC3 rather than Bi-DC3A
as the basic form of the Third Derivability Condition. This despite the fact
that it is Bi-DC3A rather than Bi-DC3 that is crucial to the pivof of Bi-G2.
The Reflexivity Defense is therefore what necessitates the detour through
Bi-DC3 and the extra condition Bi-DC4 in order to obtain Bi-DC3A. As
we will see, the use of this extra condition is not without consequence.
5. The Reflexivity Defense and
the Proto-philosophical Content of G2.
Bi-G2 Ls thus the bitheorctic form of G2 provided by the Reflexivity De-
fense. Our question now is what proto-philosophical content Bi-G2 should
be seen as sustaining? In particular, we would like to know whether it can
plausibly bo regarded as sustaining the following:
Bi-Phil G2: Let S CT and let PTOUT{X) be a formula of C$ that expresses
the notion of provability-in-T in 5 and Cony a formula of Cs that is
constructed from Prov-y(x) in such a way that if PTOVT{X) expresses
the notion of provability-in-T in S, then Conr expresses the notion
of T's consistency in S. Then, if 5 is consistent, and the logic of S
supports certain inferences and theorems,
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We believe that Bi-Phil G2 is what is commonly regarded as the proto-
philosophical content of Bi-G2. We will argue that it can not plausibly
be so regarded—at least not if the justification used for Bi-DC3 is the
Refiexivity Defense. The reason is that the Reflexivity Defense does not
seem to promote a plausible form of Pivotal Implication to support the
inference from Bi-G2 to Bi-Phil G2.
What form of Pivotal Implication (PI) does the Refiexivity Defense pro-
vide? It is possible to distinguish at least five different elements involved
in such a PI. What is perhaps the core element is:
(Element 1): If there is a formula Provr(x) of Cs, that expresses the notion
of provability-in-T in 5, there is a formula Provs(x) of Cs such that
Provs(x) expresses the notion of provability-in-£ (i.e., the notion of
provability-in-the-representing-theory) in 5.
Element 1 represents what we think is a common belief concerning the
capacities of the representing theories that figure in our discussion: namely,
that if they are capable of representing the notion of provability for the
represented theory then they are capable of, representing their own notion
of provability. This is one of two key elements of the Reflexivity Defense of
Bi-DC3. The other is:
(Element 2): For any formulae Provr{x) and Provs(x) of Cs, if Provr{x)
expresses the notion of provability-in-T in S and Prov${x) expresses
the notion of provability-in-5 in S, then Provs(x) and Provr(x)
satisfy Bi-DC3.
In addition to these elements, we can assume that the Reflexivity Defense
of Bi-DC3 is augmented by a defense of Bi-DCl and Bi-DC2 that implies
that:
(Element 3): For every formula Prau-r{x) of Cs, if Provr{x) expresses the
notion of provability-in-T in S, then Provr{x) satisfies Bi-DCl and
Bi-DC2.
A defense of Bi-DCl is indeed presupposed by the Reflexivity Defense. A
defense of Bi-DC2 is not, but we will suppose for the sake of argument that
there is such a defense and that it can be added to the Reflexivity Defense
to form a defense of the larger set of conditions needed for the proof of
Bi-G2 Lemma.
This leaves Bi-DC4 to consider. No justification of it is implied either
by the Reflexivity Defense proper or by a defense of Bi-DCl and Bi-DC2.
It requires a justification of its own, one which says that If 5 is a subtheory
of T, then 5 should be able to 'see' this with respect to its expressions of
S and T. In other words, it should be the case that
(Element 4): For 5 and T such that S C T, if Pravs(x) and Provr(x)
are formulae of Cs that express the notions of provability-in-S and
provability-in-T, respectively, then Provs(x) and Provr(x) together
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satisfy Bi-DC4.
Taken together, Elements 1-4 are the chief ingredients of our answer to
the question regarding the form of Pivotal Implication that is to be provided
by the Reflexivity Defense. One less central question remains.
It concerns the Bi-DL and its justification. So long as it is plausible to
think that a formula representing the notion of provability-in-T will be a
formula of one free variable, and so long as it is assumed that S is a fragment
of arithmetic in which the numeralization, substitution and diagonalization
functions are representable, it will be plausible to maintain the Bi-DL.
These are all constraints that we are willing to grant the advocate of the
Reflexivity Defense. Hence, we are willing to grant that
(Element 5): For any formula Provr(x) of Cs, if Prm>r{x) expresses the
notion of provability-in-T in S, then Provr(x) satisfies Bi-DL.
The above five elements thus constitute the (expanded form of) Pivotal
Implication sponsored by the Reflexivity Defense. For convenience's sake
we now condense these five elements into the following two principles:
(Bi-PIAl): For 5 and T such that S C T and formulae Provr{x) and
Provs(x) of Cs that express (in S) the notions of provability-in-T
and provability-in-S, respectively, Provr(x) and Provs(x) together
satisfy Bi-DCl-Bi-DC4 and the Bi-DL.
(Bi-PIA2): If there is a formula Praur(x) of Cs that expresses the notion
of provability-in-T in S, then there is a formula Provs(x) of Cs
that expresses the notion of provability-in-5 in S.12
We effect this condensation to highlight two importantly different types
of conditions that figure in Elements 1-5. The one type, embodied in Bi-
PIAl, identifies Bi-DL and Bi-DCl-Bi-DC4 as necessary conditions on the
ability of formulae to express the notions of provability-in-T and provability-
in-S. It comes from items 2-5 of the elements enumerated above. The other
type, embodied in BUPIA2 takes S's ability to represent T as sufficient for
its ability to represent itself.
We will not mount an independent challenge to either the first or second
types of conditions in isolation.13 Rather, we question their joint plausibil-
ity. In addition we would note that both seem to be necessary in order to
secure Bi-Phil G2 as an entailment of Bi-G2. Specifically, Bi-PIAl, taken
by itself, is not enough to secure the connection. Taken together with
12
 We understand Bi-PIA2 to assume that the represented theory T is recursively ax-
iomatizable. This is in keeping with the idea in Hilbert's Program that the represented
theory be treated as a formal object. This is not to deny, of course, that Hilbert's ideas
might be extended to a larger class of represented theories along such lines, say, as those
described in Schutte |19C0| and |1977|.
13
 We believe that both conditions can be challenged, however. In particular, we believe
that neither Bi-DC3 nor Bi-DCM is plausible.
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Bi-G2, it entails only the very different proto-philosophical claim14
(Bi-Phil G2A): Let 5 C T and let Provr{x) and Provs(x) be formulae of
£«,• that express in S the notions of provability-in-T and provability-
in-S, respectively. Finally, let Cony be a formula of Cs constructed
from Provr(x) in such a way that if PTOVT(X) expresses the notion
of provability-in-T in 5, then Cany expresses the notion of T's con-
sistency in 5. Then, if S is consistent, and the logic of S supports
certain inferences and theorems, fsCcmr-
If, therefore, Bi-Phil G2 is to be defended as the proto-philosophical reading
of Bi-G2 under the Reflexivity Defense, then both Bi-PIAl and Bi-PIA2
must be defended.
Bi-PIA2, moreover, requires a defense of a different type from that of
Bi-PIAl. The reason is that it is a different type of condition. Instead
of linking the ability of formulae to express the notions of provability-in-'
T and provability-in-5 to their satisfaction of the Derivability Conditions,
as Bi-PIAl does, Bi-PIA2 links the ability of 5 to express the notion of
provability-in-T to its ability to express the notion of provability-in-5. As
we will presently see, such a linkage seems dubious.
Before developing this argument further, however, we want to say a
little about our identification of Elements 1 and 2 as the core elements of
the Reflexivity Defense. The reader may wonder why, instead of Elements
1 and 2, we did not take the following single claim as the core element of
the Reflexivity Defense.
(Element 1A): For every formula Prcn>f{x) of C$, if PTOVT(X) expresses
the notion of provability-in-T in 5, there is a formula Provs{x) of Cs
such that Provs(x) expresses the notion of provability-in-S (i.e., the
notion of provability-in-the-representing theory) in 5 and Provs(x)
and Prov-r(x) together satisfy Bi-DC3.
Element 1A is implied by Elements 1-2, but it does not in turn imply
them. We mention this because certain of our criticisms of Bi-PIAl and
Bi-PIA2 apply directly only to the conjunction of Elements 1 and 2 and
not to Element 1A. The question thus arises: Why take Elements 1 and 2
rather than Element 1A as constituting the core of the Reflexivity Defense?
The answer derives from our view of the structure of the Reflexivity
Defense. We see it as saying that (i) if there is a formula Provr(x) that ex-
presses the notion of provability-in-T in 5, then there is a formula Provs(x)
that expresses the notion of provability-in-5 in S, and that (ii) any pair
14
 There is actually more that's required. One needs a premise to the effect that M T
is a formula of Cs constructed from Provr(x) in such a way that if PTOVT(X) expresses
the notion of provability-in-T, then Con? expresses the notion of T's consistency, where
Conx is the formula Vx(Provr(x) —• -*Provr(neg{x))), or some formula that is S-
equivalent to it. Having noted this, however, we will, for simplicity's sake, suppress
mention of this condition in the proto-philosophical statements of G2.
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of sudi formulae—that is, any pair of formulae expressing provability-in-T
and provability-in-S respectively—will satisfy Bi-DC3. In other words, we
see the Reflexivity Defense as sayuig that Bi-DC3 expresses a condition on
the proper representation of provability-in-T and provability-in-S1 by any
formulae of £5 . We therefore take the following claim to follow from the
Reflexivity Defense.
(Element If): For every formula Provr(x) of £$, if Provr(x) expresses
the notion of provability-in-T in S, there is a formula Provs(x) of
Cs such that Provs(x) and Prov-r(x) together satisfy Bi-DC3.
In particular, and unlike the defender of Element 1A, we see this as fol-
lowing from Elements 1 and 2 and, so, from the ability of Provsix) and
Provr(x) to serve as genuine expressions of provability-in-5 and provabi-
lity-in-T.
One who takes Element 1A to be the core element of the Reflexivity
Defense would have to see its structure in a different way. She would
have to reason thusly: for every Prav-r{x) that expresses the notion of
provability-in-T in 5, there is a Provs(x) which both expresses the notion
of provability-in-S in 5 and which has the unrelated auxiliary property
that, when taken together with Prov-r(x), it satisfies Bi-DC3. Seen this
way, Bi-DC3 would be a purely contingent product of certain formulae that
express the notion of provability-in-5. It would not be taken as a necessary
condition on the ability of a pair of formulae to express provability-in-T
and provability-in-S, respectively.
We don't find this a plausible interpretation of the Reflexivity Defense—
or any other defense of Bi-DC3, for that matter. Accordingly, we will not
consider it further. We mention it only to explain to the reader why we take
Elements 1 and 2 rather than Element 1A as the core of the Reflexivity
Defense. This done, we now turn our attention to Bi-PIAl and Bi-PIA2,
where we will argue that they are jointly implausible.
Our arguments are of three types. All are intended to call Bi-PIA2
into question given the conditions on proper representation laid down in
Bi-PIAl. In the first argument the condition featured is Bi-DCl. In the
second and third arguments, the focal condition Is Bi-DC4—the 'extra'
condition made necessary by the generalization of the Reflexivity Defense
to bitheoretic settings. The arguments are strategically related.
The first accepts the general idea—suggested by the use of Bi-DCl in Bi-
PIAl—that proper representation of a set a in S requires the enumeration
in S of <7.15 It then observes the lack of any verified, general connection
16
 For tho reader who may not be familiar wilh ihe terminology, a set of n-tuples of
numbers 0 is said to bo weakly represented in 5 by the formula T(X\ ,... ,xn) just in case
for every n-tuple of numbers ( k | , . . . , k n ) , ( k i , . . . , kn) € 0 iIT 1-5 r ( f c i , . . . , kn), where
fc, is a canonical term in S for k,. 0 is weakly representable in S just in case there is
some formula that weakly represents it in S. Enumeration is just weak representation
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between S's ability to enumerate a recursively axiomatizable theory T and
its ability to enumerate itself if its arithmetic type (i.e., its place in the
arithmetic hierarchy) is different from T's. Given that there are legitimate
questions concerning the formalizability of finitary reasoning (i.e., its exact
codification into a recursively axiomatizable theory), this serves at least
to raise questions concerning the joint general plausibility of Bi-PIAl and
BUPIA2 for cases of S assumed to contain finitary reasoning.
It only raises a question, though, and doesn't settle anything. Our sec-
ond argument therefore seeks to go beyond this by locating a weakness
in Bi-PIAl and Bi-PIA2 that rests upon something more than the mere
uncertainty of the formalizability of finitary reasoning. It therefore grants
the formalizability of finitary reasoning as a strategic concession and goes
on to show that even if this is assumed there is ample room to doubt the
plausibility of Bi-PIA2 given the use (in Bi-PIAl) of Bi-DC4 as a necessary
condition on the proper representation of the notions of provability-in-5 and
provability-in-T. The argument is that Bi-DC4 does not generally hold for
pairs of formulae expressing the notions or concepts of provability-in-S and
provability-in-T for 5 and T such that S C T. The conclusion is that
Bi-PIAl and Bi-PIA2 can not both be generally maintained as conditions
governing the representation of concepts.
The third argument seeks to take the claim of the second argument
beyond the level of concept representation to the (more basic?) level of set
representation. It argues that Bi-DC4 does not generally hold for pairs of
recursively enumerable sets S and T such that S CT . If correct, it shows
that Bi-PIAl and Bi-PIA2 can not be maintained as conditions governing
the representation of sets—even recursively enumerable sets—generally.
This, in outline, is our argument. We now proceed with the details.
First Argument
We begin by considering the case where T is a recursively axiomatizable
theory and S a subthcory of T, though not a recursively axiomatizable one.
The chief fact to be borne in mind here is that S's having the ability to
enumerate £1 or recursively enumerable sets (i.e., sets of the arithmetic
type that T is assumed to be) does not guarantee it the ability to enumer-
ate sets of other arithmetic types (e.g., sets of type En, n > 1). If it is
granted that S's overall ability to represent or express itself requires that it
enumerate itself,10 it then follows that S's ability to represent T does not
in the lefl-lo-right direction. Hence, r ( x i , . . . , z n ) enumerates 0 in S just in case, for
every n-tuplc of numbers (ki , . . . , kn), (k i , . . . , kn) 6 0 only if \~s T(A:I, . . . ,fcn). 0 is
enuraeraWe in S just in case there is a formula that enumerates it in S.
16
 The advocate of the inference from Bi-G2 to Bi-Phil G2 has to grant this; otherwise,
she loses her justification for Bi-DCl. The justification for Bi-DCl is general. That is,
it assumes that for any set or properly <t and any formula 4> of the language of S, <j>
represents * in S only if it enumerates * in S.
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imply a similar ability on its part to represent itself. That being the case,
Bi-PIA2 would appear to be groundless . . . at least insofar as there are
serious reasons for believing that S might be something other than a Ei or
recursively enumerable theory. It is to a consideration of such reasons that
we now turn.
Our reasons stem from a closer consideration of finitary reasoning and
of what can be regarded as its 'internal' structure—a structure which, it
seems, is suggested by a suitably refined understanding of the nature of
finitary reasoning, albeit one the likes of which one seldom finds mentioned
in the literature.17
The structure arises from the fact that not all finitary evidence is on
the same cpistemological footing. In particular, there is a type of finitary
evidence that functions as the 'data' of finitary thought and another type
that can be thought of as less basic. The former is expressed by those state-
ments that arc decidable solely by means of finitary judgments concerning
particular finitary objects, (or finite assemblages thereof). In the context
of a first-order arithmetic language, these are the statements expressed by
variable-free sentences—the statements making up the decidable fragment
of first-order arithmetic.
The latter is expressed by sentences containing variables; sentences which
serve not as judgments proper but as 'judgment-schemata' or 'judgment-
forms'. These are devices which become genuine judgments or assertions
when, and, in Hubert's view, only when, numerals or other closed terms are
substituted for the variables that occur in them. Despite their schematic
status, these judgment-schemata were treated by Hilbert as capable of some
type of 'acceptance' (resp. 'rejection') by finitary reasoners; namely, that
which is constituted by a disposition to affirm each of their instances.
Just what might serve as the rational basis for such a disposition, how
a disposition to assert all instances of a schema might differ from a simple
brute capacity to assert them all, and how we might come to be in possession
of such a disposition are points on which Hilbert said nothing of significance.
This notwithstanding, the acceptability of a finitary schema should be
seen as depending upon its compatibility with the more basic propositions
of finitary thought—the so-called singular judgments or propositions. This
induces an internal epistemic structure among finitary judgments. In addi-
tion, finitary schemata might admit of an internal structuring that repre-
sents an ordering of relative acceptability among them. Such an ordering
could in part arise from strict differences in relative logical strength (i.e.,
from the fact that one schema is strictly stronger than another). It could
also arise from and reflect non-logically based differences—epistemic dif-
ferences l>etween distinguishable types of evidence all of which count as
17
 A partial exception is Sinorynski (|1988), pp. 38-40).
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finitary. There is nothing in the traditional formulations of finitism to pro-
hibit such differences. Indeed, they could result naturally from taking a
realistic approach to differences in the relative complexity of different fini-
tary objects. None of the usual formulations of finitism (nor any plausible
formulation of it) institutes homogeneity constraints so powerful as to pro-
hibit such differences.
To the extent that such a view of finitism is correct, finitary reasoning
could easily possess an internal epistemic structure that is not itself that of
a Ei theory. Indeed, such an internal structure is suggested by the following
general condition on finitary provability: A is finitarily provable just in case
(i) A is an acceptable (i.e., finitarily knowable) singular proposition, (ii) A
is a schema and it can be known finitarily that no instance of A is either
the denial of or is denied by an acceptable singular proposition, and (iii) A
is a schema and it can be known finitarily that A neither denies nor is the
denial of a finitary schema that occupies a place of greater elementariness
in the ordering of finitary schemata according to their relative plausibility.
Clauses (ii) and (iii) would appear to place a type of consistency constraint
on even the choice of finitary axioms. Assuming that this could be part
of an intensionally correct description of the internal structure of finitary
reasoning, and assuming that the logic used to execute the consistency check
is subject to Church's theorem, it would seem to follow that neither the
notion of axiom nor the notion of proof for finitary reasoning is necessarily
a recursive one.
The above notwithstanding, let us hasten to add that we do not know
of a way to demonstrate that the full set of finitarily acceptable statements
and schemata can not be formalized by some recursive set of formulae. The
fact that, modulo its epistcmically most natural or basic description, the
structure of the finitarily acceptable propositions and proposition-schemata
is not evidently Ei docs not. imply that there is no recursive axiomatization
of it. Our claim is therefore only that there is room to doubt that finitary
reasoning is adequately fonnalizable as a Ei theory. To the extent that
this is correct, there is room to doubt that all cases of S in which we are
interested can safely be assumed to be E] theories. Furthermore, to the
extent that, this is so and S's ability to represent itself requires its ability to
enumerate itself, it is not clear that S should have the ability to represent
itself just because it has the ability to represent a Ej-theory T. In other
words, it is not clear that. Bi-PIA2 holds.
We realize that the above argument is somewhat vague and inconclu-
sive and that it is essentially an argument from what we don't know. It
would be nice to have something more precise and conclusive to offer in its
place. In particular, it would be nice to have a way of judging the plausi-
bility of Bi-PIA2 regardless of what the exact arithmetic type of 5 might
turn out to be. To provide that, however, we would have to have either
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a better characterization of the ways in which a En theory might achieve
En-completeness or a better description of the ways (if any) in which a En
theory might achieve self-enumeration without being En-complete.
Such characterizations would, in turn, require a fuller specification of the
set of the conditions necessary for S's representation of T (modulo some
specified foundational purpose) as well as an analysis linking these condi-
tions to S's ability to enumerate itself. At present, however, neither of these
seems to be available. What we know is that Ei extensions of Q enumerate
all Ei sets and therefore enumerate themselves. In addition, we know that
all E,,-complete E,, extensions of Q enumerate themselves. What we do not
know (or at least what I do not know)—either for n in general or for specific
cases of n—is a useful characterization (i.e., a characterization related to a
specification of conditions known to be necessary for the representation of
T by S) of which, if any, E,, extensions of Q do not contain all En truths
but do enumerate themselves. A significant problem is therefore to . . .
(Problem 1): Characterize those En extensions of Q (if any) winch enumer-
ate themselves but which are not themselves En-complete.
Second Argumen t
We will now set the preceding argument aside and suppose that it is proper
to restrict both 5 and T to Ei or recursively axiomatizable theories. We
thus consider the following restriction of Bi-PIA2.
(Bi-PIA2*): For recursively axiomatizable S and T, if there is a formula
Provr{x) of Cs that expresses the notion of provability-in-T in 5 ,
then there Ls a formula Provs{x) of Cs that expresses the notion of
provability-in-5 in S.
Perhaps the first thing to note in this connection is that Bi-G2 itself
requires no such restriction. Hence, strictly speaking, the restricted form
of Bi-Phil G2 obtainable from Bi-G2 via Bi-PIA2* can not be viewed as
giving the proto-philosophical content of the full Bi-G2 but only the proto-
philosophical content of a narrower theorem which results from restricting
the choice of S in Bi-G2 to recursively axiomatizable theories. This notwith-
standing, we will consider the plausibility of Bi-PIA2* and grant, for the
sake of argument, that it is the narrower theorem just mentioned that ought
to be our chief concern.
We will therefore consider BJ-PIA2* and its justification. Throughout
our discussion, however, it will be important to keep in mind a distinction
that was noted earlier. This is the distinction between the representation
of concepts or notions, on the one hand, and the representation of sets, on
the other. As formulated, both BUPIA2* and Bi-PIA2 concern, at least on
their surfaces, the representation of concepts or notions and not (simply)
the representation of sets. We will argue that Bi-PIA2* is unjustified if, as
is asserted by Bi-PIAl, BUDC4 is taken to be a necessary condition on the
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adequate representation of the concepts of provability-in-5 and provability-
in-T. In otlier words, we will argue that Bi-DC4 does not appear to be a
legitimate constraint to place on the proper representation of the concepts
of provability-in-5 and provability-in-T.
Various examples can be used to illustrate this point. The following
simple one suits our purposes well enough.
Let 5 and M be recursively axiomatizable theories in Cs such that 5 C
M. Define T to be {r : T € M&r ^ v}, where v is a sentence of Cs that
is not a theorem of M. In addition, let Provs(x) be a formula of Cs that
expresses the notion of provability-in-5 and PTOVM{X) be a formula of Cs
that expresses the notion of provability-in-M. Finally, let Provr{x) be the
formula Provs,i(x)&x ^ n, where 'n' is the numeral in £ s for the godel
number n of the sentence v.
We claim that Prou'r(x) expresses the concept of provability-in-T ade-
quately; that is, it follows and reflects the definition of T in the way that
a formula expressing the concept of provability-in-T ought to. Further-
more, since 5 CM, the definition of T, which guarantees that MCT, also
guarantees that 5 C T.
On the other hand, however, Bi-DC4 does not seem to hold for Provs(x)
and Pro-ur(x). In particular, the instance lPraus{n) —• Provr{n)' does not
seem to hold. The reasoning is as follows. If we assume, as above, that
PTOVS{V) is a formula of Cs that expresses the notion of provability-in-5,
and we assume that the monotheoretic version of G2 holds for 5 (for Cons
defined in the usual way from Praus(x)), and we assume that the logic
of 5 preserves certain principles and inferences that we may assume it to
preserve, then we may conclude both that
(1) \f-s -iProvs{n).
and that
(2) hs n = n.
From (2) and the definition of Provr(x), it then follows that
(3) h s -^Provr(n).
However, from (3) and the hypothesis that
(4) y-s Provs(n) -> Provr(n),
it follows that
(5) l-s ~>Provs{n).
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Assuming the consistency of S, then, the hypothesis in (4)—which is an
instance of Di-DC4—can not be accepted.
It follows that if the standard for the representation of concepts artic-
ulated in Bi-PIAl is accepted—specifically, that Bi-DC4 is accepted as a
necessary condition on the ability of Provs{x) and PTOVT{X) to express
the concepts of provability-in-S and provability-in-T—then Bi-PIA2* can
not generally be accepted as a condition on the adequate representation of
provability concepts.18 From this it follows in turn that the inference from
Bi-G2 to Bi-Phil G2 can not be accepted, and this means that Bi-G2 can
not rightly be regarded as 'saying' Bi-Phil G2.
It would appear, then, that there is a problem concerning the justification
of Bi-DC4. Specifically, if Trovs and Trovr are pre-arithmetic, informal
provability concepts that present the theorem-sets S and T respectively,19
then the following principle can not be used to justify it.
(Proto-Bi-DC4): If 5 and T are theories such that S C T, and IProvs
and TTOVT are the concepts by which S and T (respectively) are
intensionally given, then if Provs{x) and Provr(x) are to represent,
respectively, Trovs and y r o v T in 5 , Bi-DC4 must hold oiProvs{x)
and Provr(x).
Nor can the more general standard of concept representation—a stan-
dard that applies to concepts generally, and not just to provability concepts
—that stands behind Proto-Bi-DC4 be accepted. According to this more
general standard, if the formulae T and Q of a given representing theory
S arc to represent the informal concepts CF and CG, whose extensions are
F and G, respectively, S must capture or express the subset relations that
obtain between F and G as theorems involving T and Q. Somewhat more
precisely:
(Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4): If S and T are sets such that S C T, and Cs and
&r are the concepts by which S and T are intensionally given, then,
if the formulae Cs(x) and Cr{x) are to adequately represent or
express Cs and Op in a theory 6, it must be the case that for every
n, ho Cs(n) —> C'i'(n) (where 'n' is a term in the language of 6 that
is acknowledged to be a designator of n).
As the case constructed earlier shows, Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4 can not be
18
 I have benefited from discussions of this and related matters (i.e., conditions properly
regarded as governing the representation of concepts) with George Boolos, Julia Knight,
Mike Stob and Peter Cholak.
18
 In calling Vrovs and Vrovr 'pro-arithmetic' provability concepts presenting S and
T, I mean only that they are the provability concepts of the theories S and T as they
(the theories and their provability concepts) are given prior to arithmetization. They are
therefore the concepts that the formulae Provs and Provr are supposed to represent in
S.
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accepted as a generally valid constraint on the representation of concepts.
The formulae Provs(x) and Provr{x) of that case are acceptable expres-
sions of the pre-arithmetic concepts of provability-in-S and provability-in-T
defined there, but they do not satisfy the appropriate instance of Gen-Proto-
Bi-DC4.
We conclude that it is not generally necessary that formulae expressing
or representing concepts in a given theory S should instance-wise capture
(as theorems of the representing theory) the subset relations that obtain
between the extensions of those concepts. There are, I believe, two basic
facts which account for this. The first is that for a formula T to serve as a
proper representation of a concept C in a theory 8, what is necessary is that
the defining characteristics of C be registered hi 6 as theorems concerning T.
The second is that not everything that may l)e known or proved about given
concepts (including facts regarding their extensions) by those ordinary users
of the concepts who grasp them is rightly regarded as a defining feature of
them.
Evidently, these arc points of some subtlety since the following reasoning
seems to be widely used without comment: (i) for many pairs of theories S,
T, it is possible, using the pre-arithmetic informal provability concepts by
which they arc presented, to prove (in the informal metamathematics of S
and T) that every theorem of the one is a theorem of the other; therefore,
(ii) for such pairs of theories, it is proper to take Bi-DC4 as a necessary
condition on the ability of the formulae Provs{x) and Provr(x) properly
to represent those pro-arithmetic provability concepts in S. If the argument
given above is correct, however, such an attitude is wrong; the inference
from (i) to (ii) can not be accepted without further justification.
There are, I believe, two principal strategies that one might pursue in
attempting to provide such justification. Each, however, appears to require
solutions to some fairly difficult problems.
The first strategy concedes that Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4 does not hold for
concepts generally and even that it does not hold for provability concepts
generally (/.e., it concedes that Proto-Bi-DC4 does not generally hold).
It seeks, nonetheless, to make a case for Proto-Bi-DC4 as a restricted
principle;—one that holds for certain pairs of provability concepts. The
motivating idea behind this strategy is that there seem to be cases where
the subsumption of the extension of one concept by that of another is imme-
diate from their definitions. In such cases, it may be reasonable to regard
knowledge of such subsumpt.ion as partially constitutive of what is involved
in grasp of the concepts.
Perhaps the clearest case of this type is one where the axioms and rules
of inference in terms of which one of the provability concepts is defined are
themselves explicitly included among the axioms and rules of inference in
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terms of which the other provability concept is defined.20 In such cases, it
may well be that sheer grasp (hence, sheer representation) of the provability
concepts involved necessitates knowledge (or instance-wise knowledge) of
the subsumption of the one concept's extension by that of the other. The
problem, however, is that the statement, proof and applications of Bi-G2
are generally not restricted to such cases. This means that one advocating
the usual interpreted version of Gddel's Second Theorem (i.e., the Bi-Phil
G2 reading of Bi-G2) must provide an argument that does not look to be
easy to provide; specifically, she must
(Problem 2): Explain, for the full range of theories S and T such that
S C T and the full range of provability concepts 3>rovs and JProvr
for which Bi-G2 can be proved, why a proper grasp of 3>rovs and
TVOVT requires knowledge (or instance-wise knowledge) that SQT,
even though this is not generally required for grasp of concepts one
of whose extensions subsumes that of the other.
In other words, the advocate of the traditional interpretation of Bi-G2
must say what it Ls about the provability concepts in Bi-G2 that makes
knowledge (or instance-wise knowledge) of the subsumption relation that
exists between their extensions a necessary condition of their proper grasp.
I do not believe that a satisfactory solution to this problem can be given.
Hence, I do not believe that there is anything about Bi-G2's holding of a pair
of provability concepts Vrovs and 3>rovx such that S C T that justifies
placing a condition like Bi-DC4 on formulae purporting to represent or
express IProvs and IProvr- What can be, and often is, true is that Bi-
DC4 is p7vvable for formulae representing such pairs Of provability concepts.
That Bi-DC4 may be provable, however, does not imply that it is justifiable.
To prove Bi-DC4 does not show that it is a necessary condition on the
ability of formulae of the language of S to properly repivsent or express the
concepts !Provs and [Provr-
Third Argument
On the basis of the above argument, then, we claim that Bi-PIA2*—and,
hence, the usual interpretation of Bi-G2—can not be maintained when the
criteria for representing the concepts of provability-in-T and provability-
in-S are taken to include satisfaction of Bi-DC4. This notwithstanding,
some might still argue that Bi-DG4 holds when Provs(x) and Provr{x) are
formulae that express the provability concepts which 'naturally' (or perhaps
'canonically') present the theorem-sets T and S. It is this possibility that
we will now consider.
The basic ideas behind this attempt to justify Bi-DC4 are that (i) con-
20
 As specific examples, consider the usual formal axiomatic definitions of the well known
systems of first-order arithmetic Q and PA.
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cepts are ways of presenting sets and that (ii) for any given set, though
there may be a variety of intensionally non-equivalent concepts by which it
can (in some sense) be presented, there is a single concept or a restricted
class of concepts that present it best. We will refer to this supposed optimal
presentation of a set as its 'preferred' or 'canonical' concept.
Given this idea of canonically presenting concepts for sets, the following
might be offered as a general principle justifying Bi-DC4.
(Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4A): Where 5 and T are sets, and C{S) and C(T) are
concepts that canonically present S and T, and S CT, it should
be the case that for any representing theory 0 and any formulae
Cs{x) and CT(X) of the language of 0, if Cs{x) and CT(%) ade-
quately represent C(S) and C{T) (respectively) in 0, then, for every
», l~o Cs{n) —* Cr{n) (where 'n' is a term in the language of 6
acknowledged to be a designator of n).
Advocacy of Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4A, however, exacts a tribute; namely:
(1) to identify a set of general characteristics of concepts that are those
characteristics that are responsible for their being the canonical presenta-
tions of the sets they present; (2) to explain what it is about the general
characteristics identified that should make concepts possessing them the
'preferred' or 'canonical' ways of presenting the sets that they present; and
(3) to explain why it is that adequate representations of canonical con-
cepts ought always to capture any subset relations that exist between their
extensions.
None of these are easy tasks to manage. Indeed, they may not be man-
ageable at all. Adoption of Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4A as the justificatory prin-
ciple for Bi-DC4 is therefore not to be taken lightly. It brings heavy re-
sponsibilities with it. To see the kind of difficulties it encounters, consider
the following example. Let S be the set of numbers x such that there is no
odd perfect number greater than x. And let T be the empty set of numbers
presented by whatever concept, might be seen as the canonical concept pre-
senting it (e.g., the concept of being non-self-identical). For all we know,
no reasonable choice of representing theory 8 will decide the question of
whether there is an odd perfect number. At the same time, however, it
cau safely be assumed that a reasonable choice of 6 will, for each n, prove
'n = n', which we may assume to be (provably equivalent in 6 to) '-iCx(n)'-
If S is presented by the concept indicated above, then we may take Cs{n)
to be the formula '-<3x(x > n &; Odd(i) & Perfect (z))'-21 Hence, assum-
ing, as above, that 6 does not decide the question of whether there is an
odd perfect number, it follows that 6 can not prove lCs{n) —» Cr(n)' for
any n.
21
 Here, of course, 'Odd(x)' and 'Perfect^)' are short for longer, more complicated
formulae of first-order arithmetic.
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If, therefore, we were to accept Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4A as the justification
of Bi-DC4, we would be obliged also to accept either that (a) the concept
of being non-self-identical does not canonically present the empty set of
numbers, or that (b) the formula lx =fi x' does not express this concept
in 6, or that (c) the concept of n's being a number such that there is
no odd perfect number greater than 11 does not canonically present the
set which is, as a matter of fact, its extension, or that (d) the formula
' - I 3 I ( X > n & Odd(i) & Perfect(z))' does not express in 0 the concept of
n's being a number such that there is no odd perfect number greater than n.
None of these alternatives seems more attractive, however, than rejection
of Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4A.
The prospects do not improve when we pass from the justification prob-
lem for Bi-DC4 to the justification problem for the type of variant of Bi-DC4
that is needed if Bi-G2 is to be used to evaluate Hilbert's Program.
The variant we have in mind is one which interprets Bi-DC4 finitarily.
Specifically, it is:
(Fin-Bi-DC4): For all m, n, h 5 Prfs(m,n) - • PrfT(f(m),n)).
Here m, n are supposed to be numerals (or other suitably canonical terms)
in Cs for m, 11, respectively, and / is taken to be a term of Cs for which
there are means of 'primitive recursive computation' in 5 (i.e., means which
'express', in the language and proof-apparatus of S, the primitive recursive
computation of the function f, which is supposed to be the function ex-
pressed by / ) . This is the type of condition that Hilbert's finitism would
require in the place of the otherwise finitarily unintelligible Bi-DC4 with
its unbounded existential quantifiers in Proi>s{x) and Prour{x).
The justification of Fin-Bi-DC4 requires a principle different from Geu-
Proto-Bi-DC4A. In particular, it calls for a principle in which reference
to the sets 5 and T is replaced by reference to the fields of relations and
the possible containment relationships that may exist between them. What
adoption of Fin-Bi-DC4 as a justifiable constraint on our choice of proof
expressions for S and T seems to commit us to is the idea that formulae
capable of expressing relations must capture the relations of inclusion that
exist among their various fields. One idea for a justifying principle for
Fin-Bi-DC4 is therefore the following:
(Proto-Fin-Bi-DC4-I): When <?(/?'(xt,.. . ,xn)) and C ^ x , , . . . ,xn))
are concepts that canonically present the relations Z?1 ( x i , . . . , xn) and
/ ^ ( x i , . . . , xn), respectively, and the j t h field (1 < j < n) of R1 is a
subset of the j l h field of R2, then there is a primitive recursive
function f such that for any m i , . . . , mj_i, nij, m J + i , . . . , mn, if
/?' (mi, • • •, itij_,, nij, m J + i , . . . , m,,), then R 2 ( f (mi) , . . . , f (nij_i), nij,
f (m J + i) , . . . , f (m,,)) and, for any formulae CR\ (X\, ... ,xn) and
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fp ( , . . . , xn) of the language of 6 capable of representing
C(/?' (xi , . . . , xn)) and C(Fr (xi, . . . , xn)) in 9, there are terms / and
mi , . . . , mj_i, 77ij, 77ij+i,..., m,, of the language of 6 such that, for
any m i , . . . , nij_i, nij, m J + 1 , . . . , mn,
\~o CR> (mi, . . . , m}-i, ms, mi+u . . . , mn)
-> Cfl0 (/("M )> • • •. /(ntj-i), mj, / (m J + i ) , . . . , /(rr^)).22
Proto-Fin-Bi-DC4-I generalizes Gen-Proto-Bi-DC4A by extending it
from single-field relations to many-field relations. It requires that formulae
taken to express relations instance-wise capture subset relations that exist
between parallel fields of them. Specifically, it requires a primitive recur-
sive way of constructing, for R2, a parallel relational 'environment' for any
field of /?' that is contained in the parallel field of R2. This amounts to a
kind of finitary 'constructibility' requirement—that any containment of a
field of /?' in the parallel field of R2 should be iuducible through a primi-
tive recursive transformation of a relational environment that preserves the
contained field of Z?1 as the parallel field of R2.
It is then further required that this 'constructibility' be part of what is
registered by any formulae of the representing theory capable of properly
representing /?' and R2.
Seen this way, the justification of Fin-Bi-DC4 (i.e., Proto-Fin-Bi-DC4-I)
is a composite of the following two principles:
(Finitary Constructibility): If C(Rl(x\,... ,xn)) and C(FP(xi,... ,xn)) are
concepts that canonically present the relations /?'(xi,... ,xn) and
/^(xi , . . . ,xn), respectively, and the j t h field (1 < j < n) of Rl is a
subset of the j U l field of R2, then there should be a primitive recursive
function f such that, for any r, if/?'(xi,... ,Xj_i, r ,x J + i , . . . ,xn), then
2 ) , r,
and
(Constructibility Registration): If C(R\x],... ,x,,)) and (^(/^(xi, . . . ,xn))
are concepts that canonically present the relations R ( x i , . . . , x n )
and / ^ ( x i , . . . ,x,,), respectively, and there is a primitive recursive
function f such that for any r, if /? ' ( i i , . . . ,Xj_ i , r, x J+i . . . xn), then
/?2(f(xi) , . . . , f (x J_i) , r, f (x J + 1 ) , . . . , f (x n ) ) , then for any represen-
ting theory 0 and any formulae CR> (x\,..., xn) and C# (xx,..., xn)
of the language of 6, if CRi{xl:... ,xn)) and C / ^ x i , . . . ,zn)) prop-
erly represent C(/?1(xi,... ,xn)) and C(R2(x [ , . . . ,xn)) in 8, there
M
 Actually, ProtoFin-Bi-DCM-I may not be as gencraJ as it ought to be. It only requires
capturing of subset relations between what we here call 'parallel' fields—that is, the j t h
field of Rl and the j t h field of fP. There is no evident reason, however, why capturing
containment relations between parallel fields of two relations ought to be more vital
to their proper representation than capturing containment relations between their non-
parallel fields.
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should be a primitive recursive term / of the language of 6 such
that for any n i j , . . . , irij_ 1, nij, mj+i, • • •, mn,
\~o CRi(m.\,... ,7nj_i,mj,mJ+i,... ,mn),
. . , /(mj-i), "lj, / (TO J + I ) , . . . , /(mn)).
It is possible to show, however, that there are binary primitive recursive
relations p(x, y) and a(x, y) such that FC does not hold. A simple example
(one of many) which illustrates this is the following: let Z?1 (x, y) be defined
as y=2x or y=2x+l and let Rr(x, y) be defined as x=y. The y such that
3x/? (x, y) form a subset of the y such that 3x.FT(x, y), since for k in the
left field of R\ (k, 2k) and (k, 2k+l) are both in /? \ and both (2k, 2k) and
(2k+l, 2k+l) are in R2. Since, however, no primitive recursive function
(indeed, no function of any kind) maps k to both 2k and 2k+l, it follows
that FC is not satisfied for this choice of R1 and R2.
It would seem, then, that FC is not generally an acceptable constraint to
place on concepts that canonically represent relations. Either that, or there
are recursive (even primitive recursive) relationships that are simply not
adequately reprcsentable in any reasonable choice of representing theory. In
either case, we believe, we are left with no adequate justification of Fin-Bi-
DC4. In the former case, we are forced to relinquish our current candidate
for a justificatory principle {viz., Proto-Fin-Bi-DC4-I); in the latter, we
are forced to renounce something perhaps even more fundamental to the
justification of Fin-Bi-DC4—namely, the idea that all primitive recursive
relations are adequately reprcsentable for reasonable choices of S.
It might be replied that the counter-example offered above to FC (hence
to Proto-Fiu-Bi-DC4-I) overlooks a feature of the particular relations—
piyxif relations—that are of direct concern to Fin-Bi-DC4; namely, that for
each value of their left fields there is a unique value for their right fields.
It might therefore be thought that a variant of FC reformulated so as to
reflect this fact would be an acceptable justificatory principle for Fin-Bi-
DC4. Such a variant would run as follows.
(Proto-Fin-Bi-DC4-II): For primitive recursive relations R'(x, y) and ( ,
y) such that (i) for every x there is a unique y such that /?*(x, y)
and a unique y such that /^(x, y), and (ii) the y such that 3xR1(x,
y) form a subset of the y such that BxPr (x, y), there is a primitive
recursive function f such that for all m, n, if ^ ( m , n), then /^(f (m),
»)•
I have two responses to this. The first is to argue that Proto-Fin-Bi-DC4-
II does not hold. The second is to argue that even if it did, the envisioned
justification of Fin-Bi-DC4 would still face grave difficulties.
The first argument begins with an appeal to Klcene's Normal Form The-
orem to obtain the existence of a non-primitive recursive function with a
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primitive recursive graph.23 We let Z?1 (x, y) be the graph of such a func-
tion ri(x)=y. Since, defined in this way, /?'(x, y) is the graph of a function,
the condition that for every x there is a unique y such that R (x, y) is
guaranteed to be satisfied. We then let /^(x, y) be the graph of the iden-
tity function r^(x) = x. By this definition of /^(x, y), satisfaction of the
condition that for every x there is a unique y such that /^(x, y) is like-
wise guaranteed. Given this way of defining Rl(x, y) and /^(x, y), we are
also clearly guaranteed that the y such that 3x/?x(x, y) form a subset of
the y such that 3xR2(x, y). There can, however, be no primitive recursive
function f such that
(1) for all m, n, if R\m, n), then /^(f (m), n).
For suppose there were. Then, by (1) and the definition of /^(x, y) as the
identity relation, it would follow that
(2) for all m, n, if Rx(m, n), then f (m)=n.
But by the logic of identity we would then have it that
(3) for all m, n, if f(m)=n, then /?'(m, n) iff R\m, f(m)).
By (2) and (3) it would thus follow that
(4) for all m, n, if /?'(m, n), then R\m, f (m)),
and from (4) and the definition of /?' (x, y) (as the graph of ri(x)) it would
follow further that
(5) for all m, n, if r1(m)=n, then ri(m)=f(m).
(5), however, implies that for all in, ri(m)=f(m), and this contradicts the
original assumption that ri(x) is a recursive but not primitive recursive
function. Hence, Proto-Fin-Bi-DC4-II does not generally hold.
The hoped-for justificatory principle for Fin-Bi-DC4—namely, prototyp-
ical condition Proto-Fin-Bi-DC4-II—is therefore unacceptable. Hence, the
currently envisioned justification of Fin-Bi-DC4 fails. This leaves the de-
fender of Fin-Bi-DC4 with a dilemma: either (a) maintain Fin-Bi-DC4, but
relinquish the more general prototypical principle Proto-Bi-DC4-II upon
which to base it, or (b) relinquish Fin-Bi-DC4 as an appropriate constraint
to place on the representation of the proof relations for S and T.
To grant (b), of course, is to admit our claim: namely, that the finitary
correlates of Bi-PIAl and BUPIA2 can not both be maintained and that
a version of Bi-G2 modified so as to apply to the evaluation of Hilbert's
Program can not therefore rightly be interpreted as 'saying' that no formula
of S that expresses the finitary consistency of T is provable in S (in cases
where 5 is a theory into which finitary reasoning may be embedded and
SQT).
23
 I am grateful to Stan Wainer Tor suggesting this type of application of Kleene's Normal
Form Theorem.
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If, on the other hand, (a) is adopted, the defender of Fin-Bi-DC4 must
either (1) maintain that though Fin-Bi-DC4 is a legitimate condition to
place on the representation of the particular primitive recursive relations
that are the proof-relations for 5 and T, the parallel conditions for other
primitive recursive relations can not generally be maintained to be valid
conditions on their representation, or (2) hold that not all primitive re-
cursive relations are properly represeutable in S. Both (1) and (2) seem
unattractive.
Even without these problems, however, advocacy of Proto-Fln-Bi-DC4-
II as a justificatory principle for Fin-Bi-DC4 is problematic. The reason is
that the shift from Fin-Bi-DC4-I to Fin-Bi-DC4-II seems arbitrary. Why
should it be more important for the proper representation of Z?1 (x, y) and
/^(x, y) that their representing formulae capture subset relations between
their right fields when the values of their right fields are unique (with re-
spect to a given value of their left fields) than when they are not unique?
Why should uniqueness have (or be granted) this type of normative force
in the representation of relations? For that matter, why should it only be
subset relations between parallel fields that need be captured in order to
adequately represent relations? Why not require that subset relationships
between non-parallel fields of relations be captured as well? But would any-
one seriously maintain that subset relations between any two fields, parallel
or not, of any two relations (of any arity whatsoever) must be instance-wise
registered by any formulae capable of representing those relations?
Such questions seem to challenge our understanding of the appropriate
standards for representation. I therefore leave the reader with the following
problem (s).
(Problem 3): (i) Specify which relationships of containment among the vari-
ous fields of a given family of relations must be registered by formulae
capable of adequately representing those relations, (ii) Explain why
it is that adequate representation of these relations requires that it
be exactly these containment relationships and no others that need
to be registered.
It seems, then, that even for the representation of sets—as distinguished
from the representation of notions or concepts—there is no general reason
to accept Bi-PIA2* and Bi-PIAl (rcsp. their finitary counterparts) if one
also accepts Bi-DC4 (resp. its finitary counterpart).
I would like to close this section with two disclaimers. The first is that I
do not deny that there are many pairs of recursively enumerable sets and/or
recursive (or primitive recursive) relations for which Bi-DC4 and/or Fin-Bi-
DC4 liold. My argument requires only that the holding of Bi-DC4 or Fin-Bi-
DC4 be distinguished from their being justified—that is, from their being
properly regarded as necessary conditions on the adequate representation of
5 and T and/or their proof-relations. The difference is important since, as
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noted before, formulae can and do satisfy conditions that are not necessary
to their ability to represent the sets and/or relations they may represent.
Secondly, I do not deny that Bi-DC4 and/or Fin-Bi-DC4 may be proper
conditions to place on the representation of T and S in certain specific cases.
As mentioned earlier in connection with Problem 2, there are cases where
S CT holds because of some more thorough-going relationship of similarity
between S and T (e.g., when all proofs in 5 are proofs in T). In certain such
cases, a Bi-DC4-like condition may be justifiable. Similarly with certain
cases where Bi-G2 obtains not because S C T , but because of a relationship
between S and T that is more general than S CT (e.g., cases where, though
S is not a subtheory of T, there is nonetheless a 'translation'—one which
preserves such things as proof and/or theoremhood—from proofs and/or
theorems of S to proofs and/or theorems of T).24
None of this, however, changes the fact that not all relationships between
S and T that permit a pixwf of Bi-G2 also permit a justification of the
conditions (viz. the particular Bi-DC4-like condition) that such proofs place
on the representation of the proof and/or provability relations of S and T.
We have argued this in the particular case of the relationship S C T.
But the same type of problem arises in the case of other relationships as
well. They all show a need for a Bi-DC4-like condition at the level of
'arithmetized' mctamathematics in order to obtain a pixwf of a Bi-G2-like
theorem; and they all run into problems similar to the ones mentioned
above when it conies to justifying this condition.
The following problem therefore arises:
(Problem 4): (i) Characterize the full range of relationships between S and
T that both support a pivof of a bitlieoretic version of G2 and for
which there is a justification of the Bi-DC4-like condition used in
that proof, (ii) For each different relationship between 5 and T
that supports a proof of a bitlieoretic version of G2, give an exact
statement of the Bi-DC4-like condition that is needed and provide a
justification for it.
Only when Problem 4 is solved will we be in a position to determine what
are the justified interpretations of G2 (including its bitlieoretic variants) and
to discern what it is that G2 truly 'says'. I have tried to indicate in this
section, and throughout this paper generally, how far we are from having a
solution to this problem.
6- Discussion
It has been objected that the entire line of argumentation developed in
the preceding sections rests on a failure properly to reckon the logical form
24
 Cases of this latter type require certain minor modifications of Bi-DC4 and/or Fin-
B1-DC4.
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of Bi-G2.25 Specifically, it has been claimed that all that proof of Bi-
G2 requires is that Provr(x) satisfy Bi-DCl and BUDC2 and that there
exist some Jonnula T{x) of Cs which, together with Provr(x), satisfies the
following conditions.
Bi-DC3*: For every sentence A of CT,
\-s P rovr (On) - ^ ( r p r o ^ O n ) - ! ) ;
BUDC4*: For every sentence A of Cs, \~s Jr(r^~1)-* Provr(rA^).
T(x) need not express provability-in-5 in order to satisfy Bi-DC3* and
Bi-DC4*. It might, for example, be replaced by a formula Provr(x) that
expresses the notion of provability-in-T. There is therefore no need, the
reasoning continues, to introduce a formula Prous{x) that expresses the
notion of provability-in-.S. From this it follows that there is also no need to
introduce the conditions Bi-DC3 and Bi-DC4 (or Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4*).
One might just as well revert to the more nearly 'monotheoretic'
Bi-DC3f: For every sentence A of Cr,
\-s Provr(rA~i) -> ProvT(rProvT(rA~ll)~i)
as the 'instantiation' of Bi-DC3* and to the tautologous
Bi-DC4f: For every sentence A of £T, hs ProvT(rA~{)-> Provr{rA~T)
as the 'instantiation' of Bi-DC4*.26
So long as T(x) satisfies Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4*, the reasoning goes, it
does what it has to do; namely, provide a means of getting from (3) to
(5) in the proof of Bi-G2 Lemma. Once one realizes this, the argument
concludes, one sees that the entire argument of this paper is based upon
a false assumption—namely, that to prove a version of Bi-G2 in which
the conditions on the key nietamathcinatical notions are all justified, one
must introduce a formula Provs(x) whose task is to express the notion of
provability-in-5.
In reply to this objection, I have two related points to make. Before
giving them, however, I want to make it clear that I agree with the logical
claim that the objection makes—namely, that all that is needed for the
•proof of (a variant of) Bi-G2 is the existence of an T{x) that satisfies Bi-
DC3* and Bi-DC4*. What I do not agree with is that this fact casts doubt
on the analysis and argument of this paper.
The ground of my disagreement is simple and, in the end, it boils down
to a point I have already made repeatedly: namely, that to obtain an
interpreted version of G2 from a literal version of G2, it is not enough
2 5
 Warren Goldfarb and Matthew Frank raised this objection during presentation of a
condensed oral version of this paper at the Boolos Symposium in April of 1998.
2 6
 Bi-DCI, Bi-DC2 and Bi-DC3f suffice for the proof of Bi-G2 Lemma. Bi-DC3f is
not an entirely monothcorctic version of DC3 since it requires that 'Provr(t~A~t)—»
ProvT(rProvr(rA~1)~r)' be provable in S rather than T. Bi-DC3f is the same condition
we referred to earlier as Bi-DC3A.
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simply to prove G2; one must also justify the conditions on the formulae
representing the key metamathematical notions that are used in the proof.
In this paper, I have concerned myself with one particular justification of
one particular such condition—namely, the Reflexivity Defense of the Third
Condition. My claim has been that this justification requires introduction
of a formula that expresses the notion of provability-in-S and that it does
so because of the relationship that it asserts to exist between the First and
Third Conditions.
This relationship does not obtain between Bi-DC3* and Bi-DCl. It is
therefore a characteristic intrinsic to the Reflexivity Defense that demands
replacement of Bi-DG3* and Bi-DC4* by Bi-DC3 and Bi-DC4.
It may be, however, that a broader, more radical critique of our argument
is intended in the suggestion that Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4* be substituted for
Bi-DC3 and BUDC4. Thus is a critique which holds that the entire line of
thinking behind the Reflexivity Defense, and all other defenses of versions
of the Third and Fourth Conditions that are less general than Bi-DC3*
and Bi-DC4*, are fundamentally misguided and that they all misrepresent
the logical form of G2. Only the version framed in terms of Bi-DC3* and
Bi-DC4*, the critique continues, attributes to G2 a properly general form.
In response to this, I would ask a question: 'What is the justification of
the general condition whose two clauses are Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4*?'. It is,
after all, interpreted or proto-philosophical versions of G2, and not merely
literal versions, that we are interested in here. And while it may be agreed
that one can obtain (i.e., pivve) a literal version of G2 using only Bi-DC3*
and Bi-DC4*, it does not thereby follow that one can obtain an interpreted
version of G2 from it. To put it plainly, I do not believe that there is a
justification of Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4*. The replacement of Provs(x) by
!F(x) leaves one with a condition that is simply too 'abstract'—or, better,
too indefinite in content—to admit of justification. Or perhaps I ought
rather to say that it leaves one with conditions that are too indefinite to
admit of basic or non-derivative justification. A justification of Bi-DC3*-
Bi-DC4* might be derived from some more specific set of conditions such as
Bi-DC3 and Bi-DC4 or Bi-DC3f and Bi-DC4f. In such cases, however, it is
the justification of these more definite conditions and not the justification
of Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4* that is ultimately at issue, and the analysis and
argument presented above then apply.27
27
 Justification of Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4* by appeal to Bi-DC3 and Bi-DC4 would, of
course, require introduction of a formula expressing provability-in-S, and the analysis
and argument given above would then apply. Justification of Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4* by
appeal to Bi-DC3f and Bi-DOIf, on the other hand, would not seem to fit with the
thinking behind the Reflexivity Defense since Bi-DC3f lacks the requisite relationship to
Bi-DCl. The Reflexivity Defense requires that the formula making up the consequent of
the Third Condition express the property or concept In terms of which the consequent of
Bi-DCl is stated. Justification of Bi-DC3* and Bi-DC4* via justification of Bi-DC3f and
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ABSTRACT. We consider a seemingly popular justification (we call it the Re-
flexivity Defense) for the third dcrivability condition of the Hilbert-Bernays-Lob
generalization of Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem (G2). We argue that
(i) in certain settings (rouglily, those where the representing theory of an arith-
metization is allowed to be a proper subtheory of the represented theory), use of
the Reflexivity Defense to justify the third condition induces a fourth condition,
and that (ii) the justification of this fourth condition faces serious obstacles. We
conclude that, in the types of settings mentioned, the Reflexivity Defense does not
justify the usual 'reading' of G2—namely, that, the consistency of the represented
theory is not provable in the representing theory.
Bi-DOIf is therefore justification outside the bounds of the Reflexivity Defense, and sojustification oulsido the scope of interest of this paper.
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